X509 certificate verification for OpenSSL

pull/3/head
simon 8 years ago
parent fc2899af7a
commit 2c87a631fa

@ -168,53 +168,11 @@ InitializeTLS(void)
SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms();
RAND_load_file("/dev/urandom", 1024);
rfbClientLog("OpenSSL initialized.\n");
rfbClientLog("OpenSSL version %s initialized.\n", SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
rfbTLSInitialized = TRUE;
return TRUE;
}
static int
ssl_verify (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
unsigned char md5sum[16], fingerprint[40], *f;
rfbClient *client;
int err, i;
unsigned int md5len;
//char buf[257];
X509 *cert;
SSL *ssl;
if (ok)
return TRUE;
ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data (ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx ());
client = SSL_CTX_get_app_data (SSL_get_SSL_CTX(ssl));
cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert (ctx);
err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error (ctx);
/* calculate the MD5 hash of the raw certificate */
md5len = sizeof (md5sum);
X509_digest (cert, EVP_md5 (), md5sum, &md5len);
for (i = 0, f = fingerprint; i < 16; i++, f += 3)
sprintf ((char *) f, "%.2x%c", md5sum[i], i != 15 ? ':' : '\0');
#define GET_STRING(name) X509_NAME_oneline (name, buf, 256)
/* TODO: Don't just ignore certificate checks
fingerprint = key to check in db
GET_STRING (X509_get_issuer_name (cert));
GET_STRING (X509_get_subject_name (cert));
cert->valid (bool: GOOD or BAD) */
ok = TRUE;
return ok;
}
static int sock_read_ready(SSL *ssl, uint32_t ms)
{
int r = 0;
@ -253,6 +211,10 @@ static int wait_for_data(SSL *ssl, int ret, int timeout)
break;
default:
retval = 3;
long verify_res = SSL_get_verify_result(ssl);
if (verify_res != X509_V_OK)
rfbClientLog("Could not verify server certificate: %s.\n",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(verify_res));
break;
}
@ -261,17 +223,131 @@ static int wait_for_data(SSL *ssl, int ret, int timeout)
return retval;
}
static rfbBool
load_crls_from_file(char *file, SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx)
{
X509_STORE *st;
X509_CRL *crl;
int i;
int count = 0;
BIO *bio;
STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *xis = NULL;
X509_INFO *xi;
st = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ssl_ctx);
int rv = 0;
bio = BIO_new_file(file, "r");
if (bio == NULL)
return FALSE;
xis = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
BIO_free(bio);
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_INFO_num(xis); i++)
{
xi = sk_X509_INFO_value(xis, i);
if (xi->crl)
{
X509_STORE_add_crl(st, xi->crl);
xi->crl = NULL;
count++;
}
}
sk_X509_INFO_pop_free(xis, X509_INFO_free);
if (count > 0)
return TRUE;
else
return FALSE;
}
static SSL *
open_ssl_connection (rfbClient *client, int sockfd, rfbBool anonTLS)
open_ssl_connection (rfbClient *client, int sockfd, rfbBool anonTLS, rfbCredential *cred)
{
SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = NULL;
SSL *ssl = NULL;
int n, finished = 0;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
uint8_t verify_crls = cred->x509Credential.x509CrlVerifyMode;
if (!(ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method())))
{
rfbClientLog("Could not create new SSL context.\n");
return NULL;
}
param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new (SSLv23_client_method ());
/* Setup verification if not anonymous */
if (!anonTLS)
{
if (cred->x509Credential.x509CACertFile)
{
if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ssl_ctx, cred->x509Credential.x509CACertFile, NULL))
{
rfbClientLog("Failed to load CA certificate from %s.\n",
cred->x509Credential.x509CACertFile);
goto error_free_ctx;
}
} else {
rfbClientLog("Using default paths for certificate verification.\n");
SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths (ssl_ctx);
SSL_CTX_set_verify (ssl_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, &ssl_verify);
ssl = SSL_new (ssl_ctx);
}
if (cred->x509Credential.x509CACrlFile)
{
if (!load_crls_from_file(cred->x509Credential.x509CACrlFile, ssl_ctx))
{
rfbClientLog("CRLs could not be loaded.\n");
goto error_free_ctx;
}
if (verify_crls == rfbX509CrlVerifyNone) verify_crls = rfbX509CrlVerifyAll;
}
if (cred->x509Credential.x509ClientCertFile && cred->x509Credential.x509ClientKeyFile)
{
if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ssl_ctx, cred->x509Credential.x509ClientCertFile) != 1)
{
rfbClientLog("Client certificate could not be loaded.\n");
goto error_free_ctx;
}
if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ssl_ctx, cred->x509Credential.x509ClientKeyFile,
SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) != 1)
{
rfbClientLog("Client private key could not be loaded.\n");
goto error_free_ctx;
}
if (SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ssl_ctx) == 0) {
rfbClientLog("Client certificate and private key do not match.\n");
goto error_free_ctx;
}
}
SSL_CTX_set_verify(ssl_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, NULL);
if (verify_crls == rfbX509CrlVerifyClient)
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(param, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
else if (verify_crls == rfbX509CrlVerifyAll)
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(param, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK | X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
if(!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(param, client->serverHost, strlen(client->serverHost)))
{
rfbClientLog("Could not set server name for verification.\n");
goto error_free_ctx;
}
SSL_CTX_set1_param(ssl_ctx, param);
}
if (!(ssl = SSL_new (ssl_ctx)))
{
rfbClientLog("Could not create a new SSL session.\n");
goto error_free_ctx;
}
/* TODO: finetune this list, take into account anonTLS bool */
SSL_set_cipher_list(ssl, "ALL");
@ -289,24 +365,32 @@ open_ssl_connection (rfbClient *client, int sockfd, rfbBool anonTLS)
{
finished = 1;
SSL_shutdown(ssl);
SSL_free(ssl);
SSL_CTX_free(ssl_ctx);
return NULL;
goto error_free_ssl;
}
}
} while( n != 1 && finished != 1 );
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(param);
return ssl;
error_free_ssl:
SSL_free(ssl);
error_free_ctx:
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(param);
SSL_CTX_free(ssl_ctx);
return NULL;
}
static rfbBool
InitializeTLSSession(rfbClient* client, rfbBool anonTLS)
InitializeTLSSession(rfbClient* client, rfbBool anonTLS, rfbCredential *cred)
{
if (client->tlsSession) return TRUE;
client->tlsSession = open_ssl_connection (client, client->sock, anonTLS);
client->tlsSession = open_ssl_connection (client, client->sock, anonTLS, cred);
if (!client->tlsSession)
return FALSE;
@ -316,13 +400,6 @@ InitializeTLSSession(rfbClient* client, rfbBool anonTLS)
return TRUE;
}
static rfbBool
SetTLSAnonCredential(rfbClient* client)
{
rfbClientLog("TLS anonymous credential created.\n");
return TRUE;
}
static rfbBool
HandshakeTLS(rfbClient* client)
{
@ -344,7 +421,8 @@ return TRUE;
timeout--;
continue;
}
rfbClientLog("TLS handshake failed: -.\n");
rfbClientLog("TLS handshake failed.\n");
FreeTLS(client);
return FALSE;
}
@ -429,22 +507,31 @@ ReadVeNCryptSecurityType(rfbClient* client, uint32_t *result)
rfbBool
HandleAnonTLSAuth(rfbClient* client)
{
if (!InitializeTLS() || !InitializeTLSSession(client, TRUE)) return FALSE;
if (!SetTLSAnonCredential(client)) return FALSE;
if (!InitializeTLS() || !InitializeTLSSession(client, TRUE, NULL)) return FALSE;
if (!HandshakeTLS(client)) return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
static void
FreeX509Credential(rfbCredential *cred)
{
if (cred->x509Credential.x509CACertFile) free(cred->x509Credential.x509CACertFile);
if (cred->x509Credential.x509CACrlFile) free(cred->x509Credential.x509CACrlFile);
if (cred->x509Credential.x509ClientCertFile) free(cred->x509Credential.x509ClientCertFile);
if (cred->x509Credential.x509ClientKeyFile) free(cred->x509Credential.x509ClientKeyFile);
free(cred);
}
rfbBool
HandleVeNCryptAuth(rfbClient* client)
{
uint8_t major, minor, status;
uint32_t authScheme;
rfbBool anonTLS;
// gnutls_certificate_credentials_t x509_cred = NULL;
rfbCredential *cred = NULL;
rfbBool result = TRUE;
if (!InitializeTLS()) return FALSE;
@ -499,7 +586,6 @@ HandleVeNCryptAuth(rfbClient* client)
/* Get X509 Credentials if it's not anonymous */
if (!anonTLS)
{
rfbCredential *cred;
if (!client->GetCredential)
{
@ -512,39 +598,18 @@ HandleVeNCryptAuth(rfbClient* client)
rfbClientLog("Reading credential failed\n");
return FALSE;
}
/* TODO: don't just ignore this
x509_cred = CreateX509CertCredential(cred);
FreeX509Credential(cred);
if (!x509_cred) return FALSE; */
}
/* Start up the TLS session */
if (!InitializeTLSSession(client, anonTLS)) return FALSE;
if (anonTLS)
{
if (!SetTLSAnonCredential(client)) return FALSE;
}
else
{
/* TODO: don't just ignore this
if ((ret = gnutls_credentials_set(client->tlsSession, GNUTLS_CRD_CERTIFICATE, x509_cred)) < 0)
{
rfbClientLog("Cannot set x509 credential: %s.\n", gnutls_strerror(ret));
FreeTLS(client); */
return FALSE;
// }
}
if (!InitializeTLSSession(client, anonTLS, cred)) result = FALSE;
if (!HandshakeTLS(client)) return FALSE;
/* TODO: validate certificate */
if (!HandshakeTLS(client)) result = FALSE;
/* We are done here. The caller should continue with client->subAuthScheme
* to do actual sub authentication.
*/
return TRUE;
if (cred) FreeX509Credential(cred);
return result;
}
int

@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ typedef union _rfbCredential
char *x509CACrlFile;
char *x509ClientCertFile;
char *x509ClientKeyFile;
uint8_t x509CrlVerifyMode; /* Only required for OpenSSL - see meanings below */
} x509Credential;
/** Plain (VeNCrypt), MSLogon (UltraVNC) */
struct
@ -148,6 +149,13 @@ typedef union _rfbCredential
#define rfbCredentialTypeX509 1
#define rfbCredentialTypeUser 2
/* When using OpenSSL, CRLs can be included in both the x509CACrlFile and appended
to the x509CACertFile as is common with OpenSSL. When rfbX509CrlVerifyAll is
specified the CRL list must include CRLs for all certificates in the chain */
#define rfbX509CrlVerifyNone 0 /* No CRL checking is performed */
#define rfbX509CrlVerifyClient 1 /* Only the leaf server certificate is checked */
#define rfbX509CrlVerifyAll 2 /* All certificates in the server chain are checked */
struct _rfbClient;
/**

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